On Selling Organs, Blood, and Other Bodily Things

The last blog post showed “voluntary” slavery’s invalidity in a private law society. Once one recognizes this as true, a related question might arise:

Can an individual sell their body parts if they cannot sell their body?

It seems evident that the answer is “no” since, as explained before, the objective link between a person and their body is of the nature that they cannot forfeit ownership; however, to validate whether one can or cannot sell their organs, etc. we need to find if a change may occur in the objective link between a person and a part of their body.

Changing the Nature of an Objective Link

The objective link between a person and their body is their direct and immediate control over it. Is there any way that one could make the objective link indirect, i.e. make the objective link be of the same nature as the link between a specific actor and a specific external good?

The answer is obvious: Yes, a change in the nature of the objective link can occur by removing a part of their body from their body. For example, a kidney could be made an external good through the process of cutting it out of one’s body. In this instance, the person has “destroyed” the objective link between a body and a specific actor. The objective link is now appropriation, i.e. “the transformation or embordering of a previously unowned resource, Lockean homesteading, the first use or possession of the thing.” The person unquestionably owned the kidney before cutting it out, and he unquestionably transformed the kidney by cutting it out.

“Voluntary” slavery’s invalidity might make the justifiablilty of the sale of organs seem counterintuitive, but this is only because an individual can change their objective link to parts of their body. So, one may not “sell” their arm while it is still attached, but the sale of a cut off arm would be a valid sale. While there might be some unimportance of the subject for certain people, it is essential that discussion continues about private property rights and their logical conclusions. We can only do so much armchair philosophy, but figuring out what we can will be vital for the future of theory that concerns private property rights.