Here is a Hoppe quote from The Economics and Ethics of Private Property that is relevant to animals and rights:
“…while scarcity is a necessary condition for the emergence of the problem of political philosophy, it is not sufficient. For obviously, we could have conflicts regarding the use of scarce resources with, let us say, an elephant or a mosquito, yet we would not consider it possible to resolve these conflicts by means of proposing property norms. In such cases, the avoidance of possible conflicts is merely a technological, not an ethical, problem. For it to become an ethical problem, it is also necessary that the conflicting actors be capable, in principle, of argumentation.
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Whether or not persons have any rights and, if so, which ones, can only be decided in the course of argumentation (propositional exchange). Justification—proof, conjecture, refutation—is argumentative justification. Anyone who denied this proposition would become involved in a performative contradiction because his denial would itself constitute an argument. Even an ethical relativist must accept this first proposition, which has been referred to as the a priori of argumentation.
From the undeniable acceptance—the axiomatic status—of this a priori of argumentation, two equally necessary conclusions follow. First, it follows under what circumstances no rational solution to the problem of conflict arising from scarcity exists. Suppose in my earlier scenario of Crusoe and Friday that Friday was not the name of a man but of a gorilla. Obviously, just as Crusoe can run into conflict regarding his body and its standing room with Friday the man, so he might do so with Friday the gorilla. The gorilla might want to occupy the same space that Crusoe occupies. In this case, at least if the gorilla is the sort of entity that we know gorillas to be, there is in fact no rational solution to their conflict. Either the gorilla wins, and devours, crushes, or pushes Crusoe aside (that is the gorilla’s solution to the problem) or Crusoe wins, and kills, beats, chases away, or tames the gorilla (that is Crusoe’s solution). In this situation, one may indeed speak of moral relativism. One may concur with Alasdair MacIntyre, a prominent philosopher of the relativist persuasion, who asks as the title of one of his books, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?—Crusoe’s or the gorilla’s? Depending on whose side one chooses, the answer will be different. However, it is more appropriate to refer to this situation as one in which the question of justice and rationality simply does not arise: as an extra-moral situation. The existence of Friday the gorilla poses for Crusoe merely a technical problem, not a moral one. Crusoe has no other choice but to learn how to manage and control the movements of the gorilla successfully just as he must learn to manage and control the inanimate objects of his environment.
By implication, only if both parties to a conflict are capable of engaging in argumentation with one another can one speak of a moral problem and is the question of whether or not there exists a solution meaningful. Only if Friday, regardless of his physical appearance (i.e., whether he looks like a man or like a gorilla), is capable of argumentation (even if he has shown himself to be so capable only once), can he be deemed rational and does the question whether or not a correct solution to the problem of social order exists make sense. No one can be expected to give an answer to someone who has never raised a question or, more to the point, to someone who has never stated his own relativistic viewpoint in the form of an argument. In that case, this ‘other’ cannot but be regarded and treated like an animal or plant, i.e., as an extra-moral entity. Only if this other entity can in principle pause in his activity, whatever it might be, step back so to speak, and say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to something one has said, do we owe this entity an answer and, accordingly, can we possibly claim that our answer is the correct one for both parties involved in a conflict.”
Rather, because animals other than humans cannot engage in argumentation there are no rational, meaningful solutions that can be reached between a human and non-human or a non-human and a non-human, thus animals have no rights, which are nothing more than rational solutions to the problem of interpersonal conflict.
Additionally, as I have noted elsewhere, the whole idea of validity of any claim, including normative claims, only comes into existence with argumentation, i.e., the interaction between two or more speakers where they exchange propositions and questions for the purpose of finding truth. Only when argumentation, a specific type of action, arises do rights exist. Following this insight it can be seen that property rights are a practical matter. It takes at least two people to perform an argumentation. If there were only 1 person, then argumentation would not exist and neither would rights.
This also shows why animals like bears are not moral agents: they cannot engage in argumentation. They can’t recognize and respect rights. If a person is alone on an island they don’t need to justify how they act (and since there isn’t another person they can’t justify how they act even if they wanted). There is no practical need for rights when you’re Crusoe on an island without Friday.
Another point that I still need to pan out: As Hoppe wrote, “No one can be expected to give an answer to someone who has never raised a question…”, applied to non-arguing animals a speaker can’t give an answer to some non-arguing animal for the question “Do I(the animal) have rights, i.e., norms concerning myself and the scarce resources I interact with?” because the non-speaking animal never raised the question and never could. However, when arguing with other speakers we can, without contradiction, argue that non-arguing animals are no more than external scarce resources that can be homesteaded and contractually exchanged like any other external scarce resource.
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