Who does a rule apply to?

That’s the question I was asking myself when I misinterpreted David Gordon’s words.^[1]Months ago, maybe even a year ago, I read David Gordon’s response to Molyneux’s response to Gordon’s critique of his UPB book. I mistook, “How then do we discover what is an … Continue reading

So, what is a rule? A rule is simply a limit on action It can be a limit on the means or the end of the action. With that now defined, let’s move on to who, or what type of being(s), a rule could ever apply to.

For a rule to be followed the being that is subject to it is logically required to have the capability of following it. In other words, any and all rules can only apply to actors, i.e beings capable of “purposeful behavior.” If they cannot purposefully abide by the rule, then they cannot use the knowledge to limit, or guide, their action.

For example, a rule stating, “Dogs cannot bite anybody. If they have the temptation to do so, then they need to suppress the impulse,” is a useless rule, hence not a rule proper, because dogs cannot purposefully follow a rule. We understand their behavior as purely mechanistic. If they do seemingly follow a rule, then it is either by their innate nature or through conditioning.

The Litmus Test

Argumentation, the interaction between two or more speakers where they exchange truth-claims and questions for the purpose of finding truth, is the “litmus test” to discover if some being is an actor. If a being is capable of argumentation, in principle, then it would prove that it is capable of reason. That it is not just bound to animalistic, mechanistic behavior.

As Hans Hermann Hoppe points out in EEPP when talking about Crusoe and Friday, “Only if Friday, regardless of his physical appearance (i.e., whether he looks like a man or like a gorilla), is capable of argumentation (even if he has shown himself to be so capable only once), can he be deemed rational…“

Frank van Dun gives us even more of the answer in , “Argumentation Ethics and the Philosophy of Freedom.”

It is dialectically true that, in dealing with one’s likes (other human beings), one ought to presume that they are persons, at least until there is sufficient proof that they are not. The contrary presumption, that other people are not capable of reason anyway, is a dialectical contradiction, because it amounts to an aprioristic refusal to take their arguments seriously—it amounts to a refusal to even recognize their arguments as what they are: arguments.

If a man proves himself an animal rationis capax by engaging others in argumentation, then he is a person and ought to be regarded and treated as such by other persons.

A person doesn’t necessarily have to actually enter into an argument to be understood as an actor. We can understand that humans can enter into argumentation and thus are animals capable of reason, i.e.animal rationis capax, and we need evidence to the contrary to claim a specific human isn’t capable of reason. As van Dun says, to assume the opposite is simply to not take arguments as arguments by default.

There’s also another way to understand why argumentation is important to who a rule can apply to.

Hoppe points out in EEPP, “By implication, only if both parties to a conflict are capable of engaging in argumentation with one another can one speak of a moral problem and is the question of whether or not there exists a solution meaningful.“

As I state in my post Animals, Argumentation, and Rights, “Rather, because animals other than humans cannot engage in argumentation there are no rational, meaningful solutions that can be reached between a human and non-human or a non-human and a non-human, thus animals have no rights, which are nothing more than rational solutions to the problem of interpersonal conflict.” While I was specifically writing about rights, this also applies to any rule. If a being cannot engage in argumentation, in principle, then they are not capable of reason. If they are not capable of reason, then they cannot be “reasoned” with to be explained a rule or to purposefully follow a rule.

This also lines up with what Hoppe has written:

First, the question of what is just or unjust (or what is valid or not) only arises insofar as I am and others are capable of propositional exchanges—of argumentation. The question does not arise for a stone or fish because they are incapable of producing validity-claiming propositions. Yet if this is so—and one cannot deny that it is without contradicting oneself, for one cannot argue the case that one cannot argue—then any ethical proposal, or indeed any proposition, must be assumed to claim it can be validated by propositional or argumentative means.

In other words, rules can only apply to those beings capable of argumentation. Rules cannot apply to things incapable of argumentation. ^[5]More specifically, only those beings capable of argumentation that also are, in principle, potential participants in argumentation are those beings which interpersonal rules can be applied to. … Continue reading

Possible Default Answers

A default answer would be an answer that is justifiable given no specific justification regarding the question. It is the answer we can immediately come to before any justification regarding a specific rule is given.

There are only 3 types of answers that any answer can possibly fall into.

1) Nobody

2) Somebody but not everybody

3) Everybody

We can go ahead and rule out (1) through simple a priori reasoning. A rule is simply a limit on action. That implies that there must be an actor(s) that it applies to. That means “nobody” cannot be an answer to our question.

One must also understand that we are talking about a rule proper. In the question, “Who does a rule apply to,” I’m assuming that the rule is a justifiable rule; to put it differently, I’m assuming we are talking about a rule and not an unjustifiable rule. The answer to, “Who does an unjustifiable rule apply to,” is simple: nobody. The rule would be unjustifiable, hence it is not only not truly a rule but it also could not justifiably apply to any person.

Possible Answer: Somebody but not everybody, (2)

A problem that is 1 of the 2 deathblows to this answer is that “somebody” isn’t an actual answer. “Who,” can still be asked. Since it cannot be an actual answer, it cannot be a default answer. A default answer is an answer, not a non-answer.

One must change the question and our knowledge regarding the rule for this to be a possible default answer because even proposing a randomized picking of one person from all people requires a change to the details regarding the rule in question, i.e. what is given.

“Somebody” might be the answer to some rules, but it cannot be our default answer without additional details regarding the rule. More precisely, “Somebody,” strictly cannot be an actual answer, as I’ve stated before. An actual answer would have to at least include some method to decide who the rules applies to. “Somebody (picked through a lottery from X group),” would be an example.

The next deathblow is that the reason it applies to “somebody” would also be the reason it applies to any- and everybody. “Somebody” is not a special moral being. We are only talking about a rule, in the most general sense, with no specific justification for that rule. Any differences in application of the rule would be purely arbitrary, i.e. lacking a reason to justify it. There are no reasons to make distinctions between those who the rule can apply to.

It might be that in a theory justifying a specific rule that there is a reason to make distinctions between persons, or there might be a reason to make distinctions based upon the given rule in question. But the question at hand now precludes justification and has no specific details regarding the rule.

Possible Answer: 1 Person

One could try to reason that a rule must apply to somebody, and that 1 person is the minimum. That anything more must be justified from the ground-up.

This possible answer fails for the same reasons the previous one did as it is just a specific answer that falls within that type of answer. Any answer that falls within (2) must categorically fail as an answer.

Possible Answer: Everybody, (3)

Here we find ourselves with only 1 possible answer left: Everybody. All those beings capable of argumentation.

The reason should be clear by now for why this is the correct default answer.

Only actors can follow rules and have rules applied to them, and argumentation is the “litmus test” for actors. If a rule is to apply to any one, then it cannot apply to no one. The question assumes a rule does apply to somebody. If it didn’t, then the “rule” would not be a rule, i.e. limit on action. Anything more than nobody but less than everybody is purely arbitrary or not an actual answer to the question, “Who does a rule apply to?” As such, the default answer must be, “everybody.”

Generalized Form

While “everybody” means “all beings capable of argumentation and, hence, reason,” it also means, “everybody that a rule can apply to.”

From finding the default answer to the extremely general question, “Who does a rule apply to,” we have also found the default answer to any question in the form of, “Who does this specific rule (or type of rule) apply to?”

Everybody that the rule can apply to.

While the actual answer might differ from the default answer, the important part is that there is a reason(s) given as to why the actual answer differs from the default answer.

Through this simple question we have seemingly re-invented the wheel and justified the principle of universalization. We also can see that universalization is essentially about providing reasons as to why a rule applies to anybody. In an even more general way, it is just about providing reasons for truth-claims.

After the Conclusion

After I came to this conclusion I began to realize that I had read writings that were completely in-line or nearly identical to my conclusion. My initial thought process lacked van Dun and only had two insights from Hoppe and Kinsella.^[9]Hoppe’s being argumentation shows that one is an actor; Kinsella’s being that a right is a limitation on action. Let me show what I’m talking about regarding similar conclusions.

Hoppe writes this in A Theory of Socialism & Capitalism:

Quite commonly it has been observed that argumentation implies that a proposition claims universal acceptability, or, should it be a norm proposal, that it is “universalizable.” Applied to norm proposals, this is the idea, as formulated in the Golden Rule of ethics or in the Kantian Categorical Imperative, that only those norms can be justified that can be formulated as general principles which are valid for everyone without exception. Indeed, as argumentation implies that everyone who can understand an argument must in principle be able to be convinced of it simply because of its argumentative force, the universalization principle of ethics can now be understood and explained as grounded in the wider “a priori of communication and argumentation.” Yet the universalization principle only provides a purely formal criterion for morality. To be sure, checked against this criterion all proposals for valid norms which would specify different rules for different classes of people could be shown to have no legitimate claim of being universally acceptable as fair norms, unless the distinction between different classes of people were such that it implied no discrimination, but could instead be accepted as founded in the nature of things again by everyone.

Hoppe, of course, recognizes that universalization is grounded in argumentation, and that any distinctions made between people must not be arbitrary.

From a forum discussion concerning Kinsella and M&C’s Argumentation Ethics debate, Kinsella comments this:

THe point is simply to recognize that in justifying, universalizable reasons must be given. Particularizable ones, are really just arbitrary and not really reasons at all; they are examples of when the attempt to justify has stopped. ^[10]My emphasis.

That was just a hint at what he would later write about in a blog post on his site:

Raphael: Kinsella, what exactly is Hoppe’s definition of “justification”…

Stephan: I’d have to look it up to be precise, but probably something like: providing universalizable reasons for a proposition.

…

Hoppe basically points out that if you propose a norm (during argumentation, necessarily) then it cannot be viewed as just–it cannot be accepted as valid by all parties–if it is not universalizable. I.e., it has to be applied equally to all participants unless there is a good reason–grounded in the objective nature of things–to treat participants differently. For example, A says “the rule I propose is I can hit you, and you cannot hit me, because I am me, and you are you”–that is particularizable and not universalizable. To fail to universalize is really to fail to give reasons. You are simply asserting the different treatment. this is, in the end, no different than simply proceeding without an argument, without reason.^[11]My emphasis.

Here he also concludes, like I do, that universalization is just about giving reasons for a justification.

I’ve possibly come to an original approach to universalization. Even if I haven’t, I’m completely satisfied with my work and this post. It has let me unburden myself from a question that had been coming back to me for what was possibly over a year. Now that it is all written out it seems so incredibly simple, but what is not seen here is the search for a definition for a rule and all the dead ends in thought. ^[12]One huge time waster was me worrying about a default answer that satisfied what I thought was a two sided question. I thought “who does a rule apply to,” meant , “who does a … Continue reading

References[+]

References
↑1	Months ago, maybe even a year ago, I read David Gordon’s response to Molyneux’s response to Gordon’s critique of his UPB book. I mistook, “How then do we discover what is an arbitrary distinction? This, I suggest, requires that we assess proposed rules case by case,” for “You must build up in your argument a case for who a rule applies to.” I mean, I agree with that, but I took it as a default answer. An assumption that a rule applied to nobody by default. “Who should we assume a rule applies to by default? Nobody.” That kind of thing. I was thrown off by “case by case” thinking he meant that you must prove case-by-case/person-by-person for why a rule applies to anybody and somebody. Looking back it is so painfully obvious what he meant, so I am not sure why my thought processes went that way. Anyways, this lead to think on the question of, “Who does a rule apply to?” A very abstract question, yes, but to assess it one must dive into what a rule is, their purpose, who a rule can apply to, etc. I have an answer thought out, but it isn’t well articulated yet. I haven’t sat down, write down, and then edit it to chisel out the finer wording of it. Honestly, the more I have thought about it, especially as of late, the more I have had a growing suspicion that this might be interrelated to universalization. If you ask me to give you the reasons, then it would be more of me telling you my answer to the question and the reasons behind them. I think then somebody could understand my suspicion.
↑2	Kinsella, while specifically talking about rights, is correct when it comes to this. The Non-Aggression Principle as a Limit on Action, Not on Property Rights
↑3	Ludwig von Mises, Human Action Action can also be said to be when a person purposefully uses means guided by knowledge to attain an end.
↑4, ↑10, ↑11	My emphasis.
↑5	More specifically, only those beings capable of argumentation that also are, in principle, potential participants in argumentation are those beings which interpersonal rules can be applied to. Crusoe, while capable of argumentation, is alone on his island, incapable of being a participant in argumentation. He is also incapable of being subject to any interpersonal rules.
↑6	While in reality there are unjustifiable rules and they do apply to people, those aren’t rules that are consistent with the concept of a rule and the insights that logically follow from it. Here we are concerned with justification. The question is more closely worded, “Who does a rule justifiably apply to?”
↑7	It requires it because if it didn’t change what was given, then it clearly would just be some arbitrary default answer.
↑8	Taking into consideration specific justification of an answer regarding the question, “Who does a rule apply to,” makes any answer a non-default answer. Here we are concerned with default answers.
↑9	Hoppe’s being argumentation shows that one is an actor; Kinsella’s being that a right is a limitation on action.
↑12	One huge time waster was me worrying about a default answer that satisfied what I thought was a two sided question. I thought “who does a rule apply to,” meant , “who does a justifiable rule apply to,” and, “who does an unjustifiable rule apply to?” The answers to these are, and must be, completely different.

Who does a rule apply to?